The rising trend of religious fundamentalism has brought a radical, new perspective into the public discourse ranging from topics such as individual ethics and private faith to sociopolitical policymaking, economic practices, and the very structure of institutional society. The implications of religious fundamentalism are vast, and are worth studying in their own right, but will not constitute the topic of this particular discussion. Rather, my interest—for the time being—is centered upon the apparent collision of fundamentalism and science, and the continued battle being waged between these expansive distinctions.

Over the past decade, there has been a definitive separation between faith and reason: these two camps have developed unique systems of thought and discourse, garnering members and producing various sects and groups loosely or fully affiliated with each broad ideology. On the one side stands logic, science, and the history of Western metaphysical and philosophical dissertation; on the other stands faith and the long precedent of faith-related dialogue and institutionalized doctrine and dogma. The perceived problem is this: both positions are contending for the fundamental claim to social control; science wants to reign supreme through the medium of reason and logic, and faith wants to reign supreme through the medium of indoctrination and divinity. The tension between the two ideologies continues to rise at an unprecedented rate, and small skirmishes—legal, social, economic, etc.—play out on a daily basis. As faith threatens the sanctity of science—and as science threatens the sanctity of faith—both positions have assumed increasingly-antagonistic policies. The doctrines of faith and science have now incorporated into their foundation unilateral incompatibility; as long as the other exists, says the one position, there will be no justice/truth/peace/understanding throughout our society.

But this is not the real problem—only the excess, the byproduct of a more subtle, though nonetheless greater, dilemma. The true predicament lies in the inability of mutual discourse; in fact, the two processes—faith and reason—do not even utilize the same fundamental understandings to deliberate. They approach each other from two radically different and distinct perspectives—perspectives that cannot grasp why the opposing position is one of such relative ignorance and single-mindedness. Thus, the only conceivable outcome is one of antagonism, discord, mistrust, resentment and animosity: the previous and ongoing debates between the scientific and religious communities have not even been able to establish a common venue of rhetoric, but rely specifically on unique sets of knowledge that clash over fundamental differences. Where one places inherent value on the rigidity of logic, empirical data, observation, and discernable methods, the other concludes that the intrinsic value of a principle, object, etc. is in fact the divinity associated with that principle, object, etc., and thus supersedes the synthetic apparatuses of thought due to its transcendental nature.

It is important to draw a broad distinction here: faith is not reason, and reason is not faith. This statement should be obvious and intuitive, yet it holds tremendous weight in dictating the current discourses regarding science and religion. We can extrapolate from this distinction an even broader separation: there are two specific and divergent forms of faith. There is faith in reason, and there is faith in religion. In either situation, the individual places inherent faith into a particular method of knowledge or epistemological discourse. The two systems of belief, however, are innately dissimilar in their methods of approaching the concept of knowledge and the illustration of reality. The fundamental flaw is that each discourse attempts to disprove the other through an application of its own epistemological understanding; these attempts are futile, however, due to the distinct nature of the modes of thought.

Now, there should be two obvious questions that at this point enter into the equation: firstly, are these two discourses permanently incompatible? and secondly, why can’t these two discourses create a ground of mutual understanding to better debate their respective positions?

As to the first question, I submit that these discourses are in fact inherently compatible; one attempts to answer the “how” of the universe, and one attempts to answer the “why.” It seems that irrational emotion, distrust and resentment (in the political and social sense) has taken the place of any attempt to reconcile the two positions; the members of both sides have developed dogmatic and inflexible narratives to describe their systems of thought—narratives that leave little to no room for challenge or improvement. This seems problematic, and can certainly be seen throughout contemporary society. Regardless, it seems that the holes present in one argument can neatly be filled by the extension of the opposing view—to suggest that either perspective is perfect in their design or construction seems to fall well short of an adequate philosophy.

For the second question, I am not the first to suggest that the most effective and humanistic method of reconciliation would be a simple extension of mutual respect and dialogue. Yet, this commonsensical approach seems to fall on death ears; previous attempts on behalf of both sides to open up respectful channels of communication have gone unaided and unrequited, forcing instead greater mistrust and misunderstanding between the two encampments. Nevertheless, I do not see any possible alternative: if there is to be any progress between the two conditions, then both must relinquish their relative hubris and instead develop methods of common bonding. This is not to suggest that both sides continue flinging facts, figures and ideals at one another. On the contrary, this nonsensical approach has only caused strife and conflict where there should otherwise be a common interest to preserve the sanctity of social relations and provide the opportunity for both science and faith to flourish inclusively. Though I certainly may take issue with a fundamentalist approach—just as I may take issue with the extent to which science professes its omnipotence—the general basis of a democratic state is the equal discourse of all members; without this discourse, and without the relative dissent of opposing parties, the effectiveness of a democracy wanes and eventually collapses. To suppress one side exclusively is more reminiscent of a totalitarian state than it is of a utopian model.

What more can be said? This short musing is simply that—a short musing. I have declared my general position in regards to these matters—as many have done before me—in the hopes of opening up the potential for new lines of communication to replace the current bitterness associated with both sects. As always, I would encourage those that agree with my position to further pursue this objective through activity: talk to others. Attempt to actually implement these policies of respectful dialogue. Even if that dialogue may seem incompatible at first, understand that it is through the inclusive understanding of mutual exclusivity that agreements can be met. Read more. Examine these positions in a critical light. Do whatever it takes to improve the current condition of faith and reason-based rhetoric. Be tolerant of others and do not be afraid to expect the same level of tolerance. If we, as a society deeply connected through various social, economic and political bonds, are to progress, then we have no other choice than to accept the differences of others and work together to celebrate and respect those differences while also developing methods to reconcile antipodal perspectives in the hopes of constructing a more peaceful, accessible social condition. Otherwise, we shall be caught in a purgatorial liminality while neither party progresses; a state that I am confident both sides would like to avoid.

I have always thought the statement “Think for yourself” is among the most paradoxical instructions an individual can give. The statement is generally given in the hopes of the receiving party addressing a particular issue—or a general mode of thought—with an original, unique, critical mindset; yet the instruction is one that orients itself as a self-referential expression that is self-defeating. After all, if the receiving party accepts the advice blindly, then he or she is in fact ignoring the very theory of the proposal; but, if he or she does not accept the advice, then it is supposed that he or she is dictated by the concepts, thoughts, and ideals of others. The irony here is obvious: either way, one fails to think for oneself. The concept of reciprocity dominates a intellectual function that is supposed to be counter-reciprocal.

But all hope is not lost. It seems as though the only way out of this ad infinitum regression is a critical analysis of the statement itself. In order for one to actually think for oneself and avoid intellectual subjugation (even if that subjugation is intended to liberate), one must approach the advice with a sense of critical skepticism. Whether one chooses to implement the instruction immediately, postpone the observation, or ignore the proposal entirely should be a reflection upon one’s own conscientious discernment. Thus, the statement can be observed legitimately, or can be ignored legitimately: the true basis of the decision is borne in the individual’s distinct thought, and not as a product of external persuasion, manipulation or instruction.

I have always been very interested—if not perplexed—by the occasional break from the actor-audience relationship in the form of when an actor, primarily in skit and comedy shows, turns to the camera in an expression that is clearly a deviation from the actual script. I have seen this most consistently on Saturday Night Live; the actor will turn towards the camera and portray a reaction that is almost indicative of a dialogue between the actor and his audience. It is almost if the actor means to say: “Yes, I recognize that this is a representation of reality, and, though I am supposed to convince you of its authenticity, I have decided to postpone this relationship to establish a deeper bond.” This deeper bond is perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the expression. It is, in fact, the quintessential (re)development of the Goffman-Schechner performativity theory: through the actor deviating from the defined act—an act that is intended to redefine the confines of reality—the “real” reality is reinvented through the invention of the “false” reality. In this sense, the relationship between the audience and actor assumes a far greater, psychoanalytically-based understanding: in a way, the resistance of the “real” reality, which is produced through the introduction and development of the “false” reality, substantiates the “false” reality as itself a legitimate deviation from the “real” reality. It assumes the visage of the simulacra: it is a representation of the real that can only exist if there also exists a representation of the representation of reality simultaneously.

Thus, the dialogue between the actor and audience assumes a new tone. The relationship now includes the actor expressing to the audience in such a way that he or she is stating “I know this is fake, and I know that you know this is fake. In fact, you know that I know this is fake. Thus, I am no different than you.” But the actor or actress is not one of the audience—the relationship attempts to transcend its own defined limitations and reach into an unprecedented area of familiarity where the original confines an entirely redefined in such a manner that the “false” reality completely supersedes the “real” reality by defining itself as false. It therefore becomes “real” through its extension of its own falsity into a self-defining falsity. It is not restricted by the expectations of traditional standards of acting; instead, it labours as a representation of the representation of the “false” reality with impunity. It is no longer defined by the expectations of the audience, but strictly by the newly formed relationship that is purely contingent upon the decisions of the actor. Thus, the audience loses its ability to criticize or critique and instead advocates that ability to the actor; it is an action committed by the depicters of falsity that redefines falsity as an acceptable replacement of reality and transfers the control of the criticism of reality from the audience to the actor. In a direct way, it is very reminiscent of Brecht’s alienation effect—the contours of the performativity relation are implicitly addressed and simultaneously disseminated into a newly-formed equilibrium of strategic performativity in which the performance itself is a self-reference of performative theory.

I have been increasingly interested in the term “so 15 minutes ago.” Now, I understand the connotations of this term are rather, for lack of a better term, stupid—it is usually applied to the stereotypical representation of the average “valley girl” who complains about her friend’s dress, purse, etc. The implication, of course, is that the fashion that the friend is wearing is already out of style; where it may have been popular “15 minutes ago,” it is no longer a particular strong or acceptable fashion statement now. The same theoretical framework goes beyond fashion to include phrases, trends, and so forth.

There are a couple reasons this phrase is significant. Firstly, I think it is important that we place it in a greater context: in fact, the term itself has evolved over the last decade. Where we can trace the origins of the phrase back to the term “so 5 years ago,” the temporal reference of the phrase has been compounded as time goes on—“so last year,” “so six months ago,” “so last week,” etc.

What is most interesting about this linguistic evolution is how closely it has reflected the advent of decentralized communication technologies; as the internet has become more sophisticated, with more and more users participating in social networking sites, video-sharing archives, and related functions, the role of information has been drastically altered. The opinions, information and ideologies that filter in and out of the public sphere have found considerable overlap into the cyberculture; the two sociological frameworks are inherently interrelated in a symbiotic synthesis. We see this phenomenon most pronounced in the popularity of certain videos—Chris Crocker’s “Leave Britney alone!” video, for instance, received 4 million views on youtube within the first week of being posted. Of course, Crocker’s video is not unlike certain other pop-cultural, iconic phenomena that have mimicked such a successful introduction into the public sphere: “dramatic hamster,” “Shoes,” “harry potter puppets,” “The landlord,” “Charlie bit me,” and “Candy mountain” are just some examples of videos that have been circulated around the net with astonishing and seemingly random popularity.

These are extraordinary and deeply significant examples of social development, and are intrinsically connected with the conceptual basis of reality T.V.: the popularity and noteriety of Omorassa, for instance, is an interesting example of a character that has clearly outlived her “15 minutes of fame.” We see the same examples in American Idol contestants, Survivor contestants, The Real World participants, the characters of The Hills, and so on—these are individuals whose fame is deeply intertwined with a social decentralization and continued fascination with “15 minute stars.” But the implications of this are far more important than simply defining “15 minute stars” or criticizing the simplistic language of the “so 15 minutes ago” phrase; rather, the implications inherent in these examples point to a far greater, far darker truth of contemporary society writ large.

It is at this point that postmodern critique provides the perfect analytic lens: drawing heavily from Baudrillard’s critique of contemporary consumer culture, we find a glaring theory behind the supposedly innocent phrasal diction of mass culture. Indeed, it is surprising how very true the phrase “so 15 minutes ago” actually is. We live in a society, it seems, where its consumption of products and materials—the consumption that in turn instigates the duplication of a false realistic system and subsystem, a world of images, lights, sounds and no referential node—is equaled by the consumption of culture, the production and dissemination of information, ideology and technology. This system, however, is reaching its maximum internal capacity: it has begun to consume at such a rate, feeding the demands and needs of the “silent majorities,” that the culture itself cannot support its own referential necessities. Indeed, our culture has begun to consume itself as the simulated singularity, the infinite reference of a limited-reference node.

“So fifteen minutes ago” is very much a true statement—the rate in which our culture consumes culture is astonishing. It needs newer, more complete reference nodes in order to sustain the demands of its consumerist structure; more and more is required to uphold this behemoth of a reality, this neon “GARAP” that’s fuel is its own production and consumption of culture—not objects and things (though these too play a role), but the conceptual-theoretical underpinnings of social consumption itself. It is the concept of fame, of information, of unlimited technology that is feeding this giant machine; information is no longer the focus of the advertisement, the market-run divisions and distinctions. Instead, you can now purchase the concept of information, the theory of informed compatibility—the implication, of course, is that anything else is inferior, unacceptable, inappropriate in such a rapidly forward-moving age. Thus, not only does the cultural singularity require a self-referential implosion, it forces any deviation from this ideological framework to be met with social exclusion: the very inclusion of the system excludes contradicting theoretical conceptions insofar as the progression of the singularity to consume itself is not disrupted.

The purpose of this blog will be priamarily concerned with the application of postmodern theory to contemporary social issues; by analyzing social, literary and political advances through the lens of postmodern theory, the hope is to produce a comprehensive overview of how these developments interact with each other and the greater sociopolical sphere. The issues that we shall cover are numerous and varied--there is a considerable amount of material we can and will analyze, so please feel free to browse the posts. After all, one week's topic may have nothing to do with the next weeks; there is a little something for everyone. Please enjoy!