On Unscripted Soliloquies
I have always been very interested—if not perplexed—by the occasional break from the actor-audience relationship in the form of when an actor, primarily in skit and comedy shows, turns to the camera in an expression that is clearly a deviation from the actual script. I have seen this most consistently on Saturday Night Live; the actor will turn towards the camera and portray a reaction that is almost indicative of a dialogue between the actor and his audience. It is almost if the actor means to say: “Yes, I recognize that this is a representation of reality, and, though I am supposed to convince you of its authenticity, I have decided to postpone this relationship to establish a deeper bond.” This deeper bond is perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the expression. It is, in fact, the quintessential (re)development of the Goffman-Schechner performativity theory: through the actor deviating from the defined act—an act that is intended to redefine the confines of reality—the “real” reality is reinvented through the invention of the “false” reality. In this sense, the relationship between the audience and actor assumes a far greater, psychoanalytically-based understanding: in a way, the resistance of the “real” reality, which is produced through the introduction and development of the “false” reality, substantiates the “false” reality as itself a legitimate deviation from the “real” reality. It assumes the visage of the simulacra: it is a representation of the real that can only exist if there also exists a representation of the representation of reality simultaneously.
Thus, the dialogue between the actor and audience assumes a new tone. The relationship now includes the actor expressing to the audience in such a way that he or she is stating “I know this is fake, and I know that you know this is fake. In fact, you know that I know this is fake. Thus, I am no different than you.” But the actor or actress is not one of the audience—the relationship attempts to transcend its own defined limitations and reach into an unprecedented area of familiarity where the original confines an entirely redefined in such a manner that the “false” reality completely supersedes the “real” reality by defining itself as false. It therefore becomes “real” through its extension of its own falsity into a self-defining falsity. It is not restricted by the expectations of traditional standards of acting; instead, it labours as a representation of the representation of the “false” reality with impunity. It is no longer defined by the expectations of the audience, but strictly by the newly formed relationship that is purely contingent upon the decisions of the actor. Thus, the audience loses its ability to criticize or critique and instead advocates that ability to the actor; it is an action committed by the depicters of falsity that redefines falsity as an acceptable replacement of reality and transfers the control of the criticism of reality from the audience to the actor. In a direct way, it is very reminiscent of Brecht’s alienation effect—the contours of the performativity relation are implicitly addressed and simultaneously disseminated into a newly-formed equilibrium of strategic performativity in which the performance itself is a self-reference of performative theory.
Thus, the dialogue between the actor and audience assumes a new tone. The relationship now includes the actor expressing to the audience in such a way that he or she is stating “I know this is fake, and I know that you know this is fake. In fact, you know that I know this is fake. Thus, I am no different than you.” But the actor or actress is not one of the audience—the relationship attempts to transcend its own defined limitations and reach into an unprecedented area of familiarity where the original confines an entirely redefined in such a manner that the “false” reality completely supersedes the “real” reality by defining itself as false. It therefore becomes “real” through its extension of its own falsity into a self-defining falsity. It is not restricted by the expectations of traditional standards of acting; instead, it labours as a representation of the representation of the “false” reality with impunity. It is no longer defined by the expectations of the audience, but strictly by the newly formed relationship that is purely contingent upon the decisions of the actor. Thus, the audience loses its ability to criticize or critique and instead advocates that ability to the actor; it is an action committed by the depicters of falsity that redefines falsity as an acceptable replacement of reality and transfers the control of the criticism of reality from the audience to the actor. In a direct way, it is very reminiscent of Brecht’s alienation effect—the contours of the performativity relation are implicitly addressed and simultaneously disseminated into a newly-formed equilibrium of strategic performativity in which the performance itself is a self-reference of performative theory.